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When a group of individuals must make voluntary contributions towards the provision of a 
public good, the frame of the model that is conjectured to characterize the preferences of these 
individuals is important for identifying the outcome of a voluntary contribution mechanism.  
Two models of individual behaviour are examined in this note.  One model is the conventional 
model introduced by Bergstrom, Blum and Varian (1986) and the other is the Bergstrom et al. 
model augmented to reflect the equity theory of Walster, Walster and Berscheid (1978).
1
  The environments described below are developed for implementation in a controlled 
laboratory environment.  In all cases subjects will know their own endowments, payoff tables, 
the total endowment of the group and when the session will end.  The environment was 
introduced by Chan, Mestelman, Moir and Muller (1999). 
   
    Each individual i has an endowment of wi tokens. The lab dollar payoff to individual i , 
ui, is derived from the function 
ui = xi + αi G + xi G                                            (1) 
where xi is the allocation to the private good,  G = Σ gi , is the aggregate allocation to the public 
good, gi = wi - xi  is the individual’s allocation to the public good and αi is a parameter which 
                                                 
1 The augmented model is comparable to, but more general than, the individual utility 
function introduced by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) for individuals with inequality aversion.  One 
difference is that Fehr and Schmidt (1999) identify payoffs as the object of inequality aversion 
and we have used contributions to the public good relative to endowments.  Payoffs relative to 
endowments would yield the same results as relative contributions.   2 
characterizes individual preferences for the public good.  
In the baseline homogeneity treatment, all agents have the same endowment and 
preference parameters.  These agents are identified as S-type individuals.  Heterogeneity is 
introduced by making one agent (the D-type agent) different from the other two (the S-type 
agents).  The D-type agent will have either a larger endowment than the others, a stronger 
preference for the public good or both.  There are two levels of heterogeneity in endowments: 
same endowment with wi = 20 for all i , and different endowment with w1 = w2 = 18, w3 = 24, 
and two levels of heterogeneity in preferences: same preferences with αi = 9 for all i ,  and 
different preferences with  α1 = α2 = 6, α3 = 15.  In all treatments, the group endowment, W, is 60 
tokens per period and the aggregate preference parameter α = Σ αi  is 27. 
2.   The Conventional Model 
  Following Bergstrom et al. (1986), in a non-cooperative environment the best response 
function for individual i given payoff function (1) is 
gi = max (0, ( wi -  G-i + αi – 1)/2)                                                                                (2) 
 which is constrained to be non-negative.  Assuming the constraint is not binding on any subject, 
setting n = 3, recognizing that G-i = G - gi and summing over i we obtain 
G = (W + α – 3)/4                            (3) 
  Aggregate contributions in equilibrium depend only on the aggregate group endowment, 
W,  and the aggregate preference parameter, α.  Given our experimental parameterization this is 
21 tokens in all conditions. Using the equations from (2) for each of the three subjects, the 
individual Nash equilibrium contributions may be calculated for each type of subject in each of 
the four treatments.  These equilibria are reported in Table 1 along with corresponding 
distribution of payoffs. The group optimum contribution is 43 tokens.   Any combination of   3 
contributions totalling 43 will yield the same aggregate optimal payoff, but none of these 
combinations will be a Nash equilibrium. 
Note that when groups are heterogeneous in only one dimension, endowments or 
preferences, the predicted measure of equity is intermediate between the case of homogeneous 
groups and groups with heterogeneity in both dimensions.  Heterogeneity is predicted to lead to 
increasing inequality of contributions in the equilibrium state.  However, when a conventional 
Nash equilibrium is realized, payoffs are equalized (or nearly equalized) across all agents 
regardless of the heterogeneity condition.  These predictions are included in Table 1. 
3.   The Equity Theory Model 
  Chan et al. (1997) introduced a version of equity theory as presented by Walster et al. 
(1978) into the conventional public good model by augmenting the payoff function (1) by adding 
the term Πi = - fi ( wi , si) where si = (gi / wi ) - ((g1 + g2 + g3 )/ (w1 + w2 + w3 ))  and  ∂fi / ∂si <=> 
0 if si <=> 0.   si is the difference between the share of a group’s endowment invested in Market 
2 and the share of endowment invested by individual i in Market 2.  The resulting Nash 
equilibria, given that the same functional form of  fi ( wi , si) applies to each subject in a group, 
lead to the predictions regarding voluntary contributions when the augmented payoff function is 
relevant that people with lower (higher) endowments, lower (higher ) preferences for the public 
good or both will voluntary contribute more (less) when they realize a Nash equilibrium than 
they would have contributed if the equity theory term fi ( wi , si) did not augment the 
conventional payoff function. 
  In this formulation of an alternative model, the average contribution by the group is the 
measure of the equitable contribution.  Deviations from this value will induce psychic loses, 
perhaps due to feelings of guilt or spite, and will result in total payoffs lower than the induced   4 
payoff reflects.  The actual payoff function will then be the payoff function (1) augmented by 
- fi ( wi , si) . 
4. Derivation of Predictions for Homogeneity and Heterogeneity Cases when Equity Theory 
Considerations are included in the Model  
 
In all cases, the augmented payoff function is 
ui = xi + αi G + xi G – fi (wi , si )              (4) 
where   
si = (gi /wi) – (G/W) and ∂fi/∂si ≤ 0 if si ≤ 0 or ∂fi/∂si ≥ 0 if si ≥ 0      (5) 
and the budget constraint for each individual is gi + xi = wi, where gi, xi,and wi are the 
contribution to the public good, the expenditure on the private good and the endowment of 
individual i.  G is the total group contribution to the public good, W is the total group endowment 
and αi is individual i’s preference weight.  The greater this value, the greater the individual’s 
preference for the public good. 
4.1. Case 1: Homogeneous Groups 
In this Case, αi = α for all individuals and wi = w for all individuals.  From the identity of the 
endowments and payoff functions, the assumption that in the equilibrium state all individuals (1, 
2 and 3) will make the same voluntary contributions, and from (5), in an equilibrium state si = 0 
for all individuals.  Therefore, the constrained maximization of (4) results in the same voluntary 
contributions for each individual as in the conventional model because in equilibrium fi(wi, 0) = 
0. 
4.2.1  Case 2: Groups with Income Heterogeneity (the proofs for this Case are reproduced from 
Chan et al., 1997) 
 
In this Case αi = α for all individuals and w1 = w2 < w3.  From the symmetry of the endowments 
and payoff functions and identity of preferences, the assumption that in the equilibrium state low   5 
income individuals (1 and 2) will make the same voluntary contributions, and from (5), in an 
equilibrium state 
  s1 = ((g1 /w1) - (g3 /w3))(w3 /W) = - s3(w3 /2w1)          (6)     
Lemma 1:  - sign ∂f1/∂s1 = sign ∂f3/∂s3 
Proof:  From (6), s3 > 0 ↔ s1 < 0.  Hence, from the properties of fi (∙), ∂f3/∂s3  > 0 ↔ ∂f1/∂s1 < 0.  
The first order condition for the maximization of (4) by individual i , under zero conjectural 
variations is 
  αi – 1 + wi – Σ gj≠i – 2gi – (∂fi/∂si )(W – wi)/wiW= 0          (7) 
Once again, from the symmetry of the endowments and payoff functions, in an equilibrium state 
individuals with the same endowments will make the same voluntary contributions.  From these 
assumptions follow 
  α – 1 + w1 –g3 – 3g1 – (∂f1/∂s1 )(W – w1)/w1W= 0          (8) 
  α – 1 + w3 – 2g1– 2g3 – (∂f3/∂s3 )(W – w3)/w3W= 0          (9) 
which may be solved to find expressions for voluntary contributions by individuals 1, 2 and 3 as 
a function of the fi(∙) component of the augmented payoff function and the predicted voluntary 
contribution under the induced payoff function.  These expressions are  
  g1 = g1
o + 0.25[ - 2(∂f1/∂s1 )(W – w1)/w1W + (∂f3/∂s3 )(W – w3)/w3W]    (10) 
  g3 = g3
o + 0.25[2(∂f1/∂s1 )(W – w1)/w1W - 3(∂f3/∂s3 )(W – w3)/w3W]     (11) 
where gi
o = (α – 1 + 4wi – W)/4 is the Nash equilibrium voluntary contribution of the ith subject 
based on the induced payoff function. 
Lemma 2:  (g3
o / w3 ) > (g1
o / w1 ) if w3 > w1 and α1 = α3 = α   
Proof:  For corner solution cases g1
o = 0 and g3
o > 0 the result is obvious.  For interior solution 
cases, substitute  gi
o = (α – 1 + 4wi – W)/4 (the Nash equilibrium voluntary contribution) into the   6 
inequality (g3
o / w3 ) > (g1
o / w1 ) .  By rearranging the terms in the inequality the result follows 
directly. 
4.2.2  Comparison of Conventional and Equity Theory Contributions for Case 2   
From Lemma 1,  Ω = - γ(∂f1/∂s1 ) + β(∂f3/∂s3 ), where γ and β > 0, can be less than, greater than 
or equal to zero. 
1.  Suppose Ω ≤ 0, then (10) → g1 ≤ g1
o → (g1 / w1) ≤ ( g1
o / w1) and  
(11) → (g3 / w3) ≥ ( g3
o / w3).  Therefore (g3 / w3) > ( g1 / w1), and (6) → ∂f1/∂s1 < 0 and  
∂f3/∂s3 > 0.  This contradicts supposition 1. 
2.  Suppose Ω > 0, then (10) → g1 > g1
o → (g1 / w1) > ( g1
o / w1) and  
(11) → (g3 / w3) < ( g3
o / w3).  Therefore, either (g3 / w3) > ( g1 / w1) or (g3 / w3) < ( g1 / w1).  If (g3 
/ w3) < ( g1 / w1) then (6) → ∂f1/∂s1 > 0 and ∂f3/∂s3 < 0.  This contradicts supposition 2.  
However, if (g3 / w3) > ( g1 / w1) then (6) → ∂f1/∂s1 < 0 and ∂f3/∂s3 > 0.  This does not contradict 
supposition 2.  Therefore (g3 / w3) > ( g1 / w1). 
  This last result demonstrates that the term in the square brackets in (10) must be positive 
while the term in the square brackets in (11) must be negative.  The equilibrium contribution of 
low (high) endowment individuals will be greater (less) than the predicted conventional (without 
the equity consideration) induced payoff contribution. 
4.3.1  Case 3: Groups with Preference Heterogeneity 
In this case, α1 = α2 < α3 and wi = w for all individuals.  From the identity of the endowments 
and the asymmetry of the payoff functions, the assumption that in the equilibrium state low 
preference individuals (1 and 2) will make the same voluntary contributions, and from (5), in an 
equilibrium state 
  s1 = ((g1 /w) - (g3 /w))(w /W) = - s3 /2                    (12)       7 
Lemma 3:   - sign ∂f1/∂s1 = sign ∂f3/∂s3   
Proof:  From (12), s3 > 0 ↔ s1 < 0.  Hence, from the properties of fi (∙), ∂f3/∂s3  > 0 ↔ ∂f1/∂s1 < 0.  
The first order condition for the maximization of (4) by individual i, under zero conjectural 
variations, is given by equation (7).  From the identity of the endowments and asymmetry of the 
payoff functions, in an equilibrium state individuals with the same preferences will make the 
same voluntary contributions.  From these assumptions follow 
  α1 – 1 + w –g3 – 3g1 – (∂f1/∂s1 )(W – w)/wW= 0          (13) 
  α3 – 1 + w – 2g1– 2g3 – (∂f3/∂s3 )(W – w)/wW= 0          (14) 
which may be solved to find expressions for voluntary contributions by individuals 1, 2 and 3 as 
a function of the fi(∙) component of the augmented payoff function and the predicted voluntary 
contribution under the induced payoff function.  These expressions are 
  g1 = g1
o + 0.25[ - 2(∂f1/∂s1 )(W – w)/wW + (∂f3/∂s3 )(W – w)/wW]      (15) 
  g3 = g3
o + 0.25[2(∂f1/∂s1 )(W – w)/wW – 3(∂f3/∂s3 )(W – w)/wW]      (16) 
where g1
o = (2α1 – α3 – 1 + 4w – W)/4  and g3
o = (3α3 – 2α1 – 1 + 4w – W)/4 are the Nash 
equilibrium voluntary contributions of the low preference and high preference subjects based on 
the induced payoff function. 
Lemma 4:  (g3
o / w) > (g1
o / w) if w3 = w1 = w and α1 < α3 
Proof:  For corner solution cases  g1
o = 0 and g3
o > 0 the result is obvious.  For interior solution 
cases, substitute  g1
o = (2α1 – α3 – 1 + 4w – W)/4  and g3
o = (3α3 – 2α1 – 1 + 4w – W)/4 (the Nash 
equilibrium voluntary contributions) into the inequality (g3
o / w) > (g1
o / w) .  By rearranging the 
terms in the inequality the result follows directly. 
4.3.2  Comparison of Conventional and Equity Theory Contributions for Case 3 
From Lemma 3,  Ω = - γ(∂f1/∂s1 ) + β(∂f3/∂s3 ), where γ and β > 0, can be less than, greater than   8 
or equal to zero. 
3.  Suppose Ω ≤ 0, then (15) → g1 ≤ g1
o → (g1 / w) ≤ ( g1
o / w) and  
(16) → (g3 / w) ≥ ( g3
o / w).  Therefore (g3 / w) > ( g1 / w), and (A9) → ∂f1/∂s1 < 0 and  
∂f3/∂s3 > 0.  This contradicts supposition 3. 
4.  Suppose Ω > 0, then (15) → g1 > g1
o → (g1 / w) > ( g1
o / w) and  
(16) → (g3 / w) < ( g3
o / w).  Therefore, either (g3 / w) > ( g1 / w) or (g3 / w) < ( g1 / w).  If (g3 / w) 
< ( g1 / w) then (12) → ∂f1/∂s1 > 0 and ∂f3/∂s3 < 0.  This contradicts supposition 4.  However, if 
(g3 / w) > ( g1 / w) then (12) → ∂f1/∂s1 < 0 and ∂f3/∂s3 > 0.  This does not contradict supposition 
4.  Therefore (g3 / w) > ( g1 / w). 
  This last result demonstrates that the term in the square brackets in (15) must be positive 
while the term in the square brackets in (16) must be negative.  The equilibrium contribution of 
low (high) preference individuals will be greater (less) than the predicted conventional (without 
the equity consideration) induced payoff contribution for these individuals. 
4.4  Case 4: Groups with Income and Preference Heterogeneity 
In this Case, α1 = α2 < α3 and w1 = w2 < w3 .  This combines Cases 2 and 3.  The result that the 
equilibrium contribution of the low (high) preference and low (high) endowment individuals will 
be greater (less) than the predicted conventional (without equity consideration) induced payoff 
contributions for these individuals follows directly from the proofs provided for Cases 2 and 3. 
5.  Summary 
When a voluntary contribution environment such as the one described above is characterized by 
heterogeneous agents 
1)  individuals with higher incomes will contribute more than individuals with lower 
incomes,   9 
2)  individuals with greater preference for the public good will contribute more than 
individuals with lesser preference, 
3)  if equity in contributions relative to income matters, then individuals with greater 
incomes or greater preferences will contribute less than they would have contributed if 
equity in contributions did not matter, and 
4)  if equity in contributions relative to income matters, then individuals with lower incomes 
or lesser preferences will contribute more than they would have contributed if equity in 
contributions did not matter. 
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Table 1.   Experimental Design: Parameterization and Nash Equilibria by Treatment (from Chan 
et al. 1999) 
 
  Same Preferences 
(αi = 9 for i= 1, 2, 3) 
Different Preferences 
(αi = 6 for i = 1 and 2, α3 = 15) 
 
  Same 
Endowments 
(wi = 20 for i = 
1, 2, 3) 
Different 
Endowments 
(wi = 18 for i = 1 
and 2, w3 = 24) 
Same 
Endowments 
(wi = 20 for i = 
1, 2, 3)  
Different 
Endowments 
(wi = 18 for i = 1 
and 2, w3 = 24) 
Contributions         
Individual Nash  {7, 7, 7}  {5, 5, 11}  {4, 4, 13}  {2, 2, 17} 
Group Nash  21  21  21  21 
Group Optimum  43  43  43  43 
Payoffs         
Individual Nash  {475, 475, 475}  {475, 475, 475}  {478, 478, 469}  {478, 478, 469} 
Group Nash  1425  1425  1425  1425 
Group Optimum 
 
1909  1909  1909  1909 
Notes: The parameters identified above are the subject’s preference parameter for the public 
good, αi, and the subject’s endowment for each decision round, wi.  If the value of either of 
these parameters increases, then the subject’s return to public good consumption or the subject’s 
endowment in each decision round increases.  In heterogeneous environments, individuals 1 and 
2 are the S-type individuals and individual 3 is the D-type individual. 
 
 
 